I called an NSC staff meeting for six forty-five a.m. Monday morning to see where we stood
[in assessing the Assad regime's actions and developing US options in response], and to
assess what roles if any Russia and Iran might have played.1
The... NSC staff meeting confirmed my — and what seemed to be Trump's— belief that the
Douma strike required a strong near-term military response.... I called Defense Secretary
Jim Mattis at 8:05 a.m. He believed Russia was our real problem.... Mattis and I discussed
possible responses to Syria's attack, and said he would be supplying "light, medium and
heavy" options for the President's consideration, which I thought was the right approach....
I sensed, over the phone, that Mattis was reading from a prepared text.2
Through the week, more information on the attacks came in, and I spent considerable
time reviewing this data.... Proof of the Assad regime's chemical-weapons usage was
increasingly clear in public reporting... The second Syria Principals Committee meeting
convened at one thirty and again consisted largely of the various agencies reporting on
their developing planning and activity, all consistent with a strong response. I soon
realized Mattis was our biggest problem. He hadn't produced any targeting options for the
NSC or for White House Counsel Don McGahn, who needed to write an opinion on the legality
of whatever Trump ultimately decided. From long, unhappy experience, I knew what was going
on here. Mattis knew where he wanted Trump to come out militarily, and he also knew that
the way to maximize the likelihood of his view's prevailing was to deny information to
others who had a legitimate right to weigh in. It was simple truth that not presenting options
until the last minute, making sure that those options were rigged in the "right" direction,
and then table-pounding, delaying, and obfuscating as long as possible were the tactics by
which a savvy bureaucrat like Mattis could get his way.3
While briefing Trump for a later call with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, I
stressed that we had the right formula: (1) a proposed three-way attack option with France
and Britain, not just a unilateral strike as in 2017; (2) a comprehensive approach, using
political and economic as well as military means, combined with effective messaging to
explain what we were doing and why; and (3) a sustained — not just one-shot — effort.
4
With a full NSC meeting... coming that afternoon, I also told Trump wer ere essentially
being sandbagged by Mattis on the range of target options.... The Pentagon's proposed
response to Syria's chemical-weapons attack was far weaker than it should have been,
largely because Mattis had stacked the options presented to Trump in ways that left little
real choice.... Mattis was recommending to strike only chemical-weapons related targets,
even options Trump and others had asked about had not been included. Moreover, Mattis
said without qualitification that causing Russian casualties would mean we would be at war
with Russia, nonwithstanding our efforts to avoid such casualties and the Dunford-Gerasimov
conversation [(a phone conversation between Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dunford
and his counterpart in Russia, explaining the US' plan, precisely to prevent Russian
casualities)]....Mattis was looking for excuses to not to do much of anything, but he was
wrong tactically and strategically.5
Even if the President had decided on the optimal strike, the decision-making process
was completely unacceptable. We'd experienced a classic bureaucratic ploy by a classic
bureaucrat, structuring the options and information to make only his options
look acceptable in order to get his way.... I was satisfied I had acted as an honest
broker, but Mattis had been playing with marked cards. He knew how Trump responded in
such situations far better than I did.... I had been outmaneuvered by an expert
bureaucratic operator.6
Bolton goes on to say that ultimately, although the strike went well (such as it was),
it was still far shy of the retaliation Bolton wanted; ultimately, it did nothing to
deter Syria — Assad struck civilian populations again in May, 2019.7
Secretary Mattis resigned in December 2018 over differences with the Administration
on its Syria policy.